| Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items R Cole, V Gkatzelis SIAM Journal on Computing 47 (3), 1211-1236, 2018 | 159 | 2018 |
| Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare R Cole, NR Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, ... Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017 | 146 | 2017 |
| Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 251-268, 2013 | 94 | 2013 |
| Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games R Cole, JR Correa, V Gkatzelis, V Mirrokni, N Olver Games and Economic Behavior 92, 306-326, 2015 | 83* | 2015 |
| Pricing private data V Gkatzelis, C Aperjis, BA Huberman Electronic Markets, 1-15, 2015 | 74 | 2015 |
| Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, T Roughgarden Operations Research, 2016 | 65* | 2016 |
| The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions P Dütting, V Gkatzelis, T Roughgarden Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (4), 897-914, 2017 | 49 | 2017 |
| Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints K Yang, V Gkatzelis, J Stoyanovich Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019 | 48 | 2019 |
| Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents S Brânzei, V Gkatzelis, R Mehta Operations Research, 2021 | 42* | 2021 |
| Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture V Gkatzelis, D Halpern, N Shah 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2020 | 33 | 2020 |
| Positive results for mechanism design without money R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and …, 2013 | 22 | 2013 |
| The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games D Fotakis, V Gkatzelis, AC Kaporis, PG Spirakis Theory of Computing Systems 50 (3), 559-578, 2012 | 22 | 2012 |
| Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, A Gorokh, B Jin Proceedings of the 33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2022 | 19 | 2022 |
| Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service V Gkatzelis, E Markakis, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017 | 19 | 2017 |
| Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling I Caragiannis, V Gkatzelis, C Vinci Proceedings of the thirteenth conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2017 | 16 | 2017 |
| A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020 | 14 | 2020 |
| Fair and efficient memory sharing: Confronting free riders EJ Friedman, V Gkatzelis, CA Psomas, S Shenker Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 1965-1972, 2019 | 12 | 2019 |
| Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 | 10 | 2021 |
| Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty G Christodoulou, V Gkatzelis, A Sgouritsa Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
| PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents A Baklanov, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence …, 2021 | 6 | 2021 |
Richard ColeProfessor of Computer Science, Courant Institute, New York UniversityVerified email at cs.nyu.edu
