| Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations D Mishra, DC Parkes Journal of Economic Theory 132 (1), 335-366, 2007 | 177* | 2007 |
| Multi-item vickrey-dutch auctions D Mishra, DC Parkes Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 326-347, 2009 | 90* | 2009 |
| Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem D Mishra, B Rangarajan Social Choice and Welfare 29 (3), 369-382, 2007 | 81* | 2007 |
| Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model D Mishra, D Talman Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1), 6-20, 2010 | 55 | 2010 |
| Implementation in Multidimensional Dichotomous Domains D Mishra, S Roy Theoretical Economics, 2013 | 36 | 2013 |
| Mechanism design without quasilinearity T Kazumura, D Mishra, S Serizawa Theoretical Economics 15 (2), 511-544, 2020 | 34 | 2020 |
| Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach D Mishra, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 | 34 | 2012 |
| Descending price multi-item auctions D Mishra, R Garg Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2), 161-179, 2006 | 34 | 2006 |
| Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items D Mishra, D Veeramani European journal of operational research 180 (2), 617-629, 2007 | 33 | 2007 |
| Minimum cost arborescences B Dutta, D Mishra Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 120-143, 2012 | 32 | 2012 |
| A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games D Mishra, AJJ Talman International Journal of Game Theory 39 (1), 105-111, 2010 | 30* | 2010 |
| Implementation with contingent contracts R Deb, D Mishra Econometrica 82 (6), 2371-2393, 2014 | 28* | 2014 |
| Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences T Kazumura, D Mishra, S Serizawa Journal of Economic Theory 188, 105036, 2020 | 26* | 2020 |
| Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations D Dimitrov, T Marchant, D Mishra Economic Theory, 1-22, 2010 | 25 | 2010 |
| AUCTION OF MULTIPLE HETEROGENEOUS ITEMS AMONG MULTIPLE BUYERS AND SELLERS USING SOFTWARE AGENTS LINKED VIA A COMMUNICATION NETWORK R Garg, D Mishra US Patent App. 12/194,572, 2008 | 25* | 2008 |
| Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments T Marchant, D Mishra Social Choice and Welfare 44, 433-455, 2015 | 24 | 2015 |
| A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing D Mishra, D Veeramani Database and Expert Systems Applications, 2002. Proceedings. 13th …, 2002 | 24 | 2002 |
| On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem J Duives, B Heydenreich, D Mishra, R Müller, M Uetz Journal of scheduling 18, 45-59, 2015 | 23 | 2015 |
| Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces D Mishra, A Pramanik, S Roy Journal of Economic Theory 153, 103-116, 2014 | 22 | 2014 |
| Non-bossy single object auctions D Mishra, A Quadir Economic Theory Bulletin 2, 93-110, 2014 | 22 | 2014 |
David C. ParkesGeorge F. Colony Professor of Computer Science, Harvard UniversityVerified email at eecs.harvard.edu
