Xizhi Tan

20212022202320241 18 36 23

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Vasilis GkatzelisDrexel University, Computer ScienceVerified email at drexel.edu
Eric BalkanskiColumbia UniversityVerified email at columbia.edu
Alexandros PsomasAssistant Professor, Purdue UniversityVerified email at cs.purdue.edu
Daniel SchoepflinPostdoc; DIMACS - Rutgers UniversityVerified email at drexel.edu
Alkmini SgouritsaUniversity of LiverpoolVerified email at liverpool.ac.uk
Kostas KolliasGoogle ResearchVerified email at google.com
Ben BergerTel Aviv UniversityVerified email at tauex.tau.ac.il
Michal FeldmanProfessor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv UniversityVerified email at post.tau.ac.il
Marius GarbeaDrexel UniversityVerified email at drexel.edu
Paritosh VermaPurdue UniversityVerified email at purdue.edu

Xizhi Tan

Verified email at drexel.edu - Homepage


Title Sort by citations Sort by year Sort by title	Cited by Cited by	Year
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022	20	2022
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 23), 2022	15	2022
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions E Balkanski, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan 33rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2021	13	2021
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, A Sgouritsa, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022	12	2022
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020	12	2020
Online mechanism design with predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan, C Zhu arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.02879, 2023	3	2023
Optimal metric distortion with predictions B Berger, M Feldman, V Gkatzelis, X Tan arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.07495, 2023	2	2023
EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare M Garbea, V Gkatzelis, X Tan arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02280, 2023	1	2023
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan, P Verma arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.02040, 2023		2023

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