| Costly voting: A large-scale real effort experiment M Faravelli, K Kalayci, C Pimienta Experimental economics 23 (2), 468-492, 2020 | 35 | 2020 |
| Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games F De Sinopoli, C Pimienta Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2), 775-784, 2009 | 22 | 2009 |
| On the equivalence between (quasi-) perfect and sequential equilibria C Pimienta, J Shen International Journal of Game Theory 43, 395-402, 2014 | 19 | 2014 |
| Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games C Pimienta Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2), 920-927, 2009 | 11 | 2009 |
| The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games C Meroni, C Pimienta Journal of Economic Theory 169, 128-144, 2017 | 10 | 2017 |
| Reaching consensus through approval bargaining JF Laslier, M Nunez, C Pimienta Games and Economic Behavior 104, 241-251, 2017 | 9* | 2017 |
| Strategic stability in Poisson games F De Sinopoli, C Meroni, C Pimienta Journal of Economic Theory 153, 46-63, 2014 | 9 | 2014 |
| Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes C Pimienta Mathematical Social Sciences 59 (3), 364-365, 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games F De Sinopoli, G Iannantuoni, C Pimienta Social Choice and Welfare 44, 889-909, 2015 | 8* | 2015 |
| Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality F De Sinopoli, G Iannantuoni, C Pimienta Journal of Public Economic Theory 16 (5), 824-834, 2014 | 8 | 2014 |
| Implementing the median M Nuńez, C Pimienta, D Xefteris UNSW Business School Research Paper, 2018 | 6* | 2018 |
| Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection CG Pimienta, CM Litan Economic Theory 35, 539-553, 2008 | 6 | 2008 |
| Poisson–Cournot games F De Sinopoli, C Künstler, C Meroni, C Pimienta Economic Theory 75 (3), 803-840, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Costly network formation and regular equilibria F De Sinopoli, C Pimienta Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 492-497, 2010 | 3 | 2010 |
| Proportional representation with uncertainty F De Sinopoli, G Iannantuoni, E Manzoni, C Pimienta Mathematical Social Sciences 99, 18-23, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| Bayesian and consistent assessments C Pimienta Economic Theory 55, 601-617, 2014 | 2 | 2014 |
| The wisdom of the crowd: uninformed voting and the efficiency of democracy RC Bayer, M Faravelli, C Pimienta UNSW Economics Working Paper 2023-08, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| Three essays on game theory JCG Pimienta Universidad Carlos Iii De Madrid. Retrieved February 28, 2013, 2007 | 1 | 2007 |
| Tournament-stable equilibria F De Sinopoli, C Meroni, C Pimienta Journal of Mathematical Economics 86, 41-51, 2020 | | 2020 |
| Strategic refinements C Pimienta Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, 229-260, 2018 | | 2018 |
Matias NunezCNRS-CREST-Ecole PolytechniqueVerified email at ensae.fr
