| Cournot competition in networked markets K Bimpikis, S Ehsani, R Ilkılıç Management Science 65 (6), 2467-2481, 2019 | 210 | 2019 |
| Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation A Calvó-Armengol, R Ilkılıç International Journal of Game Theory 38, 51-79, 2009 | 160 | 2009 |
| Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints O Bochet, R Ilkılıç, H Moulin, J Sethuraman Theoretical Economics 7 (3), 395-423, 2012 | 41 | 2012 |
| Egalitarianism under earmark constraints O Bochet, R Ilkılıç, H Moulin Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2), 535-562, 2013 | 36 | 2013 |
| Networks of common property resources R Ilkılıç Economic Theory 47, 105-134, 2011 | 33 | 2011 |
| Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms R Ilkilic FEEM Working Paper, 2009 | 18 | 2009 |
| Allocation rules on networks R İlkılıç, Ç Kayı Social Choice and Welfare 43, 877-892, 2014 | 12 | 2014 |
| Pairwise stability: externalities and existence R Ilkilic Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (unpublished), 2004 | 7 | 2004 |
| Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. O Bochet, H Moulin, R Ilkilic, J Sethuraman BQGT, 30:1, 2010 | 5 | 2010 |
| Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game R Ilkılıç, H İkizler Review of Economic Design 23, 13-25, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| Incentive compatible and stable trade mechanisms on networks O Bochet, R İlkılıç Journal of Economic Theory 169, 218-233, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Network of Commons R Ilkiliç FEEM Working Paper, 2008 | 3 | 2008 |
| Network of commons R Ilkılıç Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2008 | 2 | 2008 |
| On Nash Bargaining with Non-Transferable Utilities R İlkılıç, M Barlo Available at SSRN 4455239, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints R Ilkilic Theoretical Economics 7 (3), 2012 | | 2012 |
| A Noncooperative Definition of Pairwise Stability in Networks R Ilkılıç | | 2010 |
| Submission Number: ASSET2009-09-00023 C Kayi, R Ilkilic | | 2009 |
| Strategic network formation and behavior on networks R Ilkilic Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2007 | | 2007 |
| u i (x, x 2, l)= x x 2–lc, where x, x 2 are their consumptions of good 1 and 2, respectively, and l is the number of links of the agent, and c is the cost of a link. R İlkılıç | | |
