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Francesc Dilmé
Francesc Dilmé
Other namesFrancesc Dilme
Professor of Economics, University of Bonn
Verified email at uni-bonn.de - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Revenue management without commitment: Dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales
F Dilme, F Li
The Review of Economic Studies 86 (5), 1999-2034, 2019
742019
Reputation building through costly adjustment
F Dilmé
Journal of Economic Theory 181, 586-626, 2019
48*2019
Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
F Dilmé
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 116-136, 2019
39*2019
Residual deterrence
F Dilmé, DF Garrett
Journal of the European Economic Association 17 (5), 1654-1686, 2019
222019
Helping behavior in large societies
F Dilmé
International Economic Review 57 (4), 1261-1278, 2016
15*2016
Dynamic signaling with dropout risk
F Dilmé, F Li
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8 (1), 57-82, 2016
15*2016
Optimal languages
F Dilmé
Available at SSRN 3331077, 2018
132018
Pre-trade private investments
F Dilmé
Games and Economic Behavior 117, 98-119, 2019
11*2019
A dynamic theory of random price discounts
F Dilmé, DF Garrett
ECONtribute Discussion Paper, 2022
92022
Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
F Dilmé
Games and Economic Behavior 134, 1-19, 2022
8*2022
Noisy signaling in discrete time
F Dilmé
Journal of Mathematical Economics 68, 13-25, 2017
8*2017
Repeated bargaining with imperfect information about previous transactions
F Dilmé
working paper, 2022
62022
Robust information transmission
F Dilmé
American Economic Review: Insights 5 (1), 111-124, 2023
42023
Lexicographic numbers in extensive form games
F Dilmé
Work in progress, accessed via https://www. francescdilme. com on, 10-09, 2023
4*2023
The role of discounting in bargaining with private information
F Dilmé
ECONtribute Discussion Paper, 2023
22023
The role of discounting in bargaining with one-sided offers
F Dilmé
ECONtribute Discussion Paper, 2021
22021
Communication between unbiased agents
F Dilmé
Games and Economic Behavior 142, 613-622, 2023
1*2023
A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
F Dilmé
International Journal of Game Theory, 1-21, 2023
12023
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
F Dilmé, DF Garrett
Econometrica 91 (3), 1025-1075, 2023
12023
Iterated Exclusion of Implausible Types in Signaling Games
F Dilme
Available at SSRN 4659679, 2023
12023
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Articles 1–20